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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78A-4-103(2)G).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court err in using a Recital, which the Hinckley Town failed to

properly post or codify, to interpret the ordinances of the town and to affirm the decision
of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority, thereby finding that Mr. Cahoon's fence is in
violation of Hinckley Town's ordinances?
a. Standard of Review:

An appellate court reviews a district court's

determination of a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard.

Mr. Cahoon has brought forth his

arguments on the basis of illegality. "Because a determination of illegality is based
on the land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level of non-binding
deference to the interpretation advanced by the land use authority." Fox v. Park City,
2008 UT 85, If 11, 200 P.3d 182; See also, Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \
28, 104 P.3d 1208.
b. Preservation:

This issue was raised and preserved before the Hinckley

Town Appeal Authority at the hearing, and in Mr. Cahoon's opening Memorandum
and his Reply Memorandum in support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(See, Appeal Authority Hearing Transcript (hereinafter "AA Hearing"), Record

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(hereinafter "R.") p. 216-220; Memorandum and Reply Memorandum, R. 268-298,
326-338).1
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to strictly construe Hinckley Town's zoning

ordinances in favor of Mr. Cahoon?
a. Standard of Review:

An appellate court reviews a district court's

determination of a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard.

Mr. Cahoon has brought forth his

arguments on the basis of illegality. ''Because a determination of illegality is based
on the land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level of non-binding
deference to the interpretation advanced by the land use authority." Fox, 2008 UT 85,
1f 11; See also, Carrier, 2004 UT 98, ^j 28.
b. Preservation: This issue was raised and preserved in Mr. Cahoon's opening
Memorandum and his Reply Memorandum in support of his Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

(See, AA Hearing, R. 216-220; Memorandum and Reply

Memorandum, R. 268-298, 326-338).

1

The pagination of the Record in this matter is somewhat confused. Normally, the
Record is stamped sequentially in reverse order. UTAH R. APP. P., Rule 11(b)(2)(A).
However, it appears in this matter that the trial court stamped each document with a
beginning number, and then stamped each page in each document in descending order.
Hence, the pages in the record begin at page 13 proceeding through to page 1, then to
page 14, then to page 17 through 15, and so on. At one point the pagination jumps from
page 33 to page 259. In order to reduce confusion, this brief will refer to the title of the
document being referenced, along with the Record page number.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3.

Did the trial court err in failing to follow the vested rights doctrine and

grant Mr. Cahoon's fence building permit when such permit complied with all of
Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances at the time of his application?
a. Standard of Review:

An appellate court reviews a district court's

determination of a land use decision made by a municipal appeal authority under an
arbitrary, capricious and illegal standard.

Mr. Cahoon has brought forth his

arguments on the basis of illegality. "Because a determination of illegality is based
on the land use authority's interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level of non-binding
deference to the interpretation advanced by the land use authority." Fox, 2008 UT 85,
\U\See

also, Carrier, 2004 UT 98, If 28.
b. Preservation:

This issue was preserved at the Hinckley Town Appeal

Authority hearing and in the trial court at oral arguments for Mr. Cahoon's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. (See Appeal Authority Hearing Documentation, R. 98106; Trial Court Oral Arguments, R. 381, Transcript p. 30, lines 13-20.)
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-3-711(1), -713, -715.
Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A) and 10-4-13(G).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2006, Appellant Alonzo Cahoon built a home on a lot he owned in Hinckley
Town, Millard County, Utah. (Building Permit, R. 45-6.) In early 2008 Mr. Cahoon
contacted Hinckley Town in regards to the construction of a fence around his home.
(Town Council Minutes, R. 47-56) Mr. Cahoon had various discussions and meetings
with the Hinckley Town Council and its Mayor in which Mr. Cahoon was given mixed
messages regarding whether he could move forward in building his fence.

(Town

Council Minutes, R. 47-56; Town Council Transcript, R. 57-86; AA Hearing, R. 153-54,
234.)

Ultimately, Mr. Cahoon built the fence in compliance with Hinckley Town's

published zoning ordinances. Specifically, Hinckley Town ordinances provide that any
solid fence built within the 30 foot front yard setback requirement cannot exceed 36
inches. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13G; R. 138.) Due to the building
permit granted to Mr. Cahoon for the construction of his home, it was unclear which
portion of Mr. Cahoon's lot would be considered the front yard. (R. 45-6.) Although,
Mr. Cahoon built portions of his molded concrete fence to exceed 36 inches in height he
ensured that the fence was set back more than 30 feet from his lot or parcel line. (AA
Hearing, R. 154, 162.)
After Mr. Cahoon constructed his fence, Hinckley Town asserted that the fence
was in violation of Town ordinances and attempted to charge Mr. Cahoon criminally.
(AA Hearing, R. 232.) However, Hinckely Town had never issued a written denial of his
fence permit. Therefore, Hinckley Town was forced to drop the criminal charges and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_A _

issued a written denial, which Mr. Cahoon appealed pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 109a-704. On March 4, 2009 the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority convened a hearing to
address Mr. Cahoon's appeal. (AA Hearing, R. 142.)
As is common in many rural communities, the street which fronts Mr. Cahoon's
home is not dedicated to the city, but rather Mr. Cahoon's title line extends to the middle
of the road. (AA Hearing, R. 154, 162, 189-192.) The Town therefore only has a rightof-way along the road fronting Mr. Cahoon's property and his lot or title line extends half
way through the road. Id. At the hearing Mr. Cahoon presented undisputed evidence that
the fence is set back 35 feet 8 inches from his property line, well within the 30 foot set
back requirement. Id. Based on the undisputed evidence of the distance between the
fence and the title line, Mr. Cahoon argued that, regardless of which part of his lot is his
side yard or front yard, the fence complies with Hinckley Town's zoning requirements
because it is set back more than 30 feet from his lot or parcel line. Id.
In response to Mr. Cahoon's argument, Hinckley Town produced at the hearing a
previously unknown and undisclosed Ordinance Amendment and Recital, dated June 2,
2005 (hereinafter "Recital"), which states that in the areas of Hinckley Town where the
roads are not Town property and where lot lines extend to the center of the road with
public rights of way, the set back is measured from the edge of the road. (Recital, R. 40;
AA Hearing, R. 185-188.) Mr. Cahoon objected to this Recital as not having been
properly posted, certified and incorporated in the Hinckley Town Code in compliance
with Utah statutes and as not having been provided to him when he requested copies of
all zoning ordinances.

(AA Hearing, R. 216-219.)

Previously, Mr. Cahoon had

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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requested copies of all applicable zoning ordinances and regulation, including the entire
municipal code of Hinckley Town. (AA Hearing, R. 218; Memorandum, R. 272.) Mr.
Cahoon was given copies of what was represented to be the complete Town Code, which
did not include this Recital. Id.
Mr. Cahoon also made arguments and presented evidence regarding his building
permit yard designations and the orientation of his home toward an un-built but platted
road, his conversation with council members and the mayor indicating he could build the
fence, and the fact that Hinckley Town had permitted other fences to be built without
complying with the Recital. (AA Hearing, R. 151-170; Memorandum, R. 272-287.)
Sometime after the March 4, 2009 hearing the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority
issued a decision directly relying on the Recital and denying Mr. Cahoon's appeal.
(Appeal Authority Decision, R. 38-40.)
In response, Mr. Cahoon filed a Petition for Review and Complaint appealing the
decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority. (Petition and Complaint, R. 1-13.)
During briefing and oral arguments Mr. Cahoon presented authority that the Recital was
not the law and could not properly form the basis for the Appeal Authority's decision,
because it had not been properly posted, certified or codified, and argued that the vested
rights doctrine and the rules for ordinance interpretation required that the Appeal
Authority's decision be overturned. (Memorandum, R. 272-283; Reply Memorandum, R.
331-36; Oral Arguments Transcript, R. 381.) On March 8, 2010, the trial court issued a
Ruling upholding the decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority and finding that
the Recital, although not the law, could be used to enforce Hinckley Town's ordinances
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

against Mr. Cahoon. (Ruling, R. 342-352.) On December 8, 2010 the trial court issued
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Affirming the Decision of the Hinckley Town Appeal
Authority. (Findings, Conclusions and Order, R. 363-371.) Mr. Cahoon filed a Notice of
Appeal on January 3, 2011. (Notice of Appeal, R. 372-373.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

j
I

The primary issue in this case is whether or not Mr. Cahoon built a fence which
complies with Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances.

Mr. Cahoon's fence facially

complies with the requirements of Hinckley Town's published ordinances, because his
fence is set back more than 35 feet from his lot line, but Hinckley Town has sought to
enforce against Mr. Cahoon a Recital which would alter the measuring line for Mr.
Cahoon's property. This Recital has never been posted, certified or incorporated into
Hinckley Town's code and, therefore, has not taken the effect of law and cannot be
enforced against Mr. Cahoon. Moreover, according to long standing rules of statutory
construction for zoning ordinances, Utah law requires that zoning ordinances be strictly
construed in favor of the private property owner's proposed use. Thus even if Hinckley
Town's ordinances are ambiguous in regards to the line for measuring set back
requirements, such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of Mr. Cahoon's proposed use.
It was improper of the trial court to use the Recital as a measuring stick for reasonable
land use restrictions, thereby enforcing the Recital against Mr. Cahoon in spite of the fact
that it is not enforceable law. This Court should reverse the decision of the Hinckley
Town Appeal Authority and reverse the decision of the trial court. Mr. Cahoon's fence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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complies with Hinckley Town's published ordinances and he is entitled to a grant of his
fence permit.
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT ZONING ORDINANCES BE
CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER, AND
MR. CAHOON'S FENCE FACIALLY COMPLIES WITH HINCKLEY
TOWN'S PUBLISHED SET BACK AND FENCING ORDINANCES.
It is black letter law in Utah that zoning ordinances must be strictly construed in
favor of the private property owner. "Since zoning ordinances are in derogation of a
property owners use of land, we are also cognizant that any ordinance prohibiting a
proposed use should be strictly construed in favor of allowing the use." Carrier v. Salt
Lake County, 2004 UT 98, \ 31, 104 P.3d 1208; see also, Rogers v. West Valley City,
2006 UT App 302, \ 15, 142 P.3d 554; Brown v. Sandy City Bd of Adjustment, 957 P.2d
207, 210 (Utah App. 1998); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602,
606 (Utah App. 1995).
The policy reason for this rule is that, under the common law, private property
owners have the right to unrestricted use of their property. In light of these fundamental
rights, zoning ordinances must be narrowly tailored to a legitimate health, safety or
welfare concern and must be strictly construed in favor of the common law property
rights they restrict. "Because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's
common-law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting
property uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Rogers, 2006 UT App 302, \ 15;
see also, Brown, 957 P.2d at 210; Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606.
In Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, this Court determined that the purposes
and broad goals of a particular ordinance were insufficient to prohibit a particular use that
was not expressly prohibited, even when such a use was inconsistent with the codified
purposes and broad goals of the ordinance. "[W]e will not find a violation of law simply
because the permitted use may appear inconsistent with the general intent statement when
the use is in compliance with the substantive provisions of the ordinance." Brown, 957
P.2d at 212. Thus, when "the use of the property] has met the legal requirements of [the
ordinance]" the proposed use must be permitted. Id.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Mr. Cahoon is entitled to rely upon Hinckely
Town's published ordinances at the time that he first made his application for a fence
permit. This principle, called the vested rights doctrine, was first articulated by the Utah
Supreme Court in Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
The vested rights doctrine has now been codified by the Utah Legislature:

"[A]n

applicant is entitled to approval of a land use application if the application conforms to
the requirements of the municipality's land use maps, zoning map, and applicable land
use ordinance in effect when a complete application is submitted and all application fees
have been paid." UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-509(l)(a). Based on this doctrine, Mr.
Cahoon was entitled to a grant of his fence building permit at the time he made
application for it, if his application complied with the ordinance "in effect" at the time of
his application.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In the present case, Mr. Cahoon's fence complies with Hinckley Town's published
ordinances. The Hinckley Town code requires that a solid fence which is placed within
the front yard set back of the lot cannot exceed a height of 36 inches. (Addendum:
Hinckley Town Code 10-4-13(G); R. 138.) Although the ordinance repeatedly mentions
the thirty foot front yard set back, the ordinance only articulates once the manner in
which the line for measuring the front yard set back is determined. "Front yard. Each lot
or parcel in the R Zone shall have a front yard of not less than thirty (30) feet."
(Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A); R. 135.) The ordinance directly references
the "lot" as the reference point for determining set back measurements. 'Lot' is defined
as, "A tract of land, esp. one having specific boundaries." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
966 (8th ed. 2004). By referencing the lot, and thereby the boundaries of a particular
portion of property, the ordinance implies that the set back is measured on the basis of the
lot or title line. Mr. Cahoon's lot, as well as those of his neighbors, goes to the center of
the road fronting their property.

(AA Hearing, R. 154, 162, 189-192.)

Thus, per

Hinckley Town's own ordinances, Mr. Cahoon is required to build his fence (which is
solid and does exceed 36 inches in height) at least 30 feet back from the edge of his
property, from his lot line. (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A) and 10-413(G); R. 138, 135.) It is undisputed by the parties that Mr. Cahoon's fence is set back
35 feet, 8 inches from the edge of his property. (AA Hearing, R. 154, 162.) Because the
fence is set back more than thirty feet from his lot or title line, his fence complies with
Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Recital, the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority determined that Mr. Cahoon's fence was in
violation of Hinckley Town's zoning ordinances. (Appeal Authority Decision, R. 38-40.)
This decision violated not only of Mr. Cahoon's right to have the zoning
ordinances construed in his favor, but the decision also violated Mr. Cahoon's right as a
citizen to notice of the laws and ordinances that apply to him.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE
RECITAL INTRODUCED BY HINCKLEY TOWN IS NOT LAW, BUT
ERRONEOUSLY ENFORCED THE RECITAL AGAINST MR. CAHOON
ANYWAY.
The constitutional protection of due process of law requires, among many other
things, that citizens have adequate notice of the laws that govern them. In a municipal
setting, it is well established that due process requires that municipal bodies maintain a
compilation of the laws in effect that the public has access to. Salina City v. Lewis, 172
P. 286, 289 (Utah 1918). This can take the form of a physical book or looseleaf, or
ordinances can be made available online. Moreover, when changes to this body of law
are made, due process requires that adequate notice be given that changes are
contemplated, and that once changes are made, the public be notified so that objections
can be made or referenda sought. Low v. City ofMonticello, 2004 UT 90, ^f 13, 103 P.3d
130.

In contemplation of these due process requirements Utah has enacted several

publication statutes which clearly outline the proper procedure for publication and notice
necessary before any passed ordinance can take effect. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3711(1). Before an ordinance, which has been passed by appropriate legislative action,
may take effect, either a short summary must be published in a local newspaper or it must
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Being a very small town (population of less than 1,000), Hinckley does not keep
its ordinances online and they can only be accessed by the public through a visit to the
Town Recorder's Office. Mr. Cahoon and his wife made two such visits for the specific
purpose of obtaining all applicable ordinances. (R. 218, 272.) On the first visit, Mrs.
Cahoon requested a complete copy of Hinckley Town's zoning and land use ordinances.
At that time she was furnished with a copy of Title 10 of the Town Code. No copy of the
Recital was provided to her. On the second visit, Mr. Cahoon requested a copy of the
entirety of Hinckley Town's Code. An entire copy of the code was provided to Mr.
Cahoon. Again, no copy of the Recital was ever produced or included.
Mr. Cahoon challenged the validity of the Recital on the basis that he had never
been provided a copy when he asked for all of Hinckley Town's ordinances, and that it
appeared that the Recital had not been posted, published, or codified, as there was no
attached certification and it was clearly not part of the codified ordinances. In response, a
member of the Town Council admitted that they had tried "to find out where it was
encoded, and apparently we did not get that accomplished." (AA Hearing, R. 185.) At
another point, this same council member stated that the Recital "was supposed to be
incorporated in title form and it did not get added, physically added I mean." (AA
Hearing, R. 193.) Finally, near the end of the hearing, another council member stated
that the Recital "was to be put in to the newly accepted ordinance, it was missed, it
wasn't put in. That was probably part of my responsibility to get that put in to the
ordinance, it was not." (AA Hearing, R. 253.)
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officials at the Appeal Authority hearing, the trial coui t properly found that "[t]he Recital
was not properly posted, certified, or incorporated into the municipal code" (Ruling, R
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went m !o enforce (lie Reciial against Mr. Cahoon anyway, The trial court reached this
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published ordinances, and that the standard of review in this matter was whether the
Iliiu kley T o w n Appeal Authority's interpretation of its ordii lances was "reasonable".
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III.

CORRECTNESS IS THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND UTAH LAW BARS ENFORCEMENT OF THE RECITAL IN ANY
FASHION.

The trial courts adoption of the standard of review as one of reasonableness, rather
than correctness and legality, was error. The standard of review for a land use decision
depends upon the basis of the dispute. If the dispute is legal in nature, then both the trial
court and the appellate court review the determination for 'correctness'. If the dispute is
factual and evidentiary in nature, then a land use decision is upheld as long as there is
'substantial evidence' in the record to support it.
This standard of review on a petition for review from the decision of a municipal
land use appeal authority is clearly outlined in UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-801(3)(c), "A
final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal." Several cases have specifically interpreted the meaning of this statute:
"Like the review of the district court, our review is limited to
whether a land use authority's decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal. A land use authority's decision is
arbitrary or capricious only if it is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record. A land use authority's
decision is illegal if it violates a law, statute, or ordinance in
effect at the time the decision was made. Because a
determination of illegality is based on the land use authority's
interpretation of zoning ordinances, we review such
determinations for correctness, but we also afford some level
of non-binding deference to the interpretation advanced by
the land use authority."
Fox v. Park City, 2008 UT 85, lj 11, 200 P.3d 182 (emphasis added); See also, Carrier,
2004 UT 98, Tl 28. "If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hinckley Town Appeal Authority and the trial court then reached outside of the
published ordinances to resolve this ambiguity and relied upon the Recital. (Ruling, R.
348-350.) In other words, the trial court found that the Recital was a good source for
determining the intent and purpose of the set back ordinances, and that if the proposed
prohibition fit within the general purpose of the ordinance, then it could be properly
prohibited. Such a decision is in direct violation of Utah law. The case of Brown v.
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment is directly on point. In that case the city admitted that the
use they were attempting to prohibit through enforcement was not literally prohibited
under their ordinances. However, the city argued that the proposed use was clearly
contrary to the broad statement of intent included in the zoning ordinance at issue. This
Court determined that a statement of intent was not adequate enough to qualify as a
prohibition. "[W]e will not find a violation of law simply because the permitted use may
appear inconsistent with the general intent statement when the use is in compliance with
the substantive provisions of the ordinance." Brown, 957 P.2d at 212.
The same principles apply to Mr. Cahoon's fence.

The zoning ordinance

indicates, or at least implies, that the fence set back is thirty feet from his lot line. Mr.
Cahoon's fence can only be prohibited if the ordinance is clear on its face that Mr.
Cahoon's fence somehow violates it.

Statements of intent or general purpose are

unavailing. A plain reading of the ordinance, construing all ambiguities in favor of Mr.
Cahoon, leads to the conclusion that his fence is in compliance with Hinckley Town's
ordinances. A Recital, which is not and cannot be enforceable law, cannot be found
enforceable anyway through semantic machinations.
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for the aforementioned reasons, this Court should hold that Mr. Gaboon's fence
complies with Flinckley Town's ordinances and thereby reverse the decision of the
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CHAPTER 4
RESIDENTIAL ZONE
R
10-4-1 Purpose
10-4-2 Permitted Uses
10-4-3 Lot Area
10-4-4 Lot Width
10-4-5 Lot Frontage
10-4-6 Prior Created Lots
10-4-7 Lot Ares Per Dwellings
10-4—8 Yard Requirements
10-4-9 Projections Into Yards
10-4-10 Building Heights
10-4-11 Parking Loading And Access
10-4-12 Site Plan Approval
10-4—13 Other Requirements

10-4-1 PURPOSE
The Residential Zone (R) is established to provide areas for the encouragement and promotion of an
environment for family life by providing for the establishment of one-family detached dwellings on
individual lots. Multiple-family dwellings under certain restrictions. This zone is typically characterized by
landscaped lots and open spaces with lawns, shrubs, small gardens and the keeping of farm animals, fowl
and non-dangerous exotic animals. It is recognized that agriculture and the raising of poultry and livestock is
desired by some property owners and is acceptable with appropriate safeguards for nearby residences.
10-4-2 PERMITTED USES
Those uses or categories of uses as listed herein, and no others, are permitted in the R zone.
A. Permitted principal uses. The following principal uses and structures, and no others, are permitted in the
Rzone.
Accessory buildings and uses clearly incidental and commonly associated with the operation of the
permitted use such as private garages, carports, greenhouses, swimming pools etc., but not including
residential occupancy.
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Animals.
Barns.
Cemeteries.
Communication Systems.
Corrals.
Churches and similar places of worship.
Community Centers that are privately-owned and operated on a nonprofit basis.
Domestic Livestock
Double Wide Mobile Homes as limited herein.
Esseintial public utility and public service installations. Such use shall not include business offices, repair,
sales or storage facilities.
Family foster homes which receive a maximum of four (4) children for regular full-time care.
Fences, hedges and walls.
Fire Station.
Gardens, fruit trees, and field crops.
Home occupations.
Identification signs, provided such signs shall not exceed one (1) per lot, and shall not exceed three (3)
square feet in area, and describe the lot upon which they are located.
Libraries.
Manufactured Homes
Multiple-Family Dwelling, including condominiums and cooperatives.
Nursing or convalescent homes.
Parades.
Personal & Family Agricultural uses only for dairying, poultry and livestock raising; provided, that
buildings used for housing fowl or animals, storing grain or feed shall not be located closer than
fifty (50) feet from any inhabitated family dwelling.
Private Country Clubs, golf courses, swimming pools, park areas, private greenhouses and private nurseries.
Privately-owned community centers operated on a nonprofit basis.
Privately-operated day nurseries, pre-schools, and kindergartens; provided, that any play area is enclosed on
all four (4) sides to a height of six (6) feet
Public Parks, playgrounds, community buildings and similar public service facilities serving residential
areas.
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Public or Private schools, churches and church schools, provided such uses do not include residence
facilities therein and are located at least forty (40) feet from all property lines.
PUD.
Religious Activities.
Rodeos.
Single-family dwellings. Single-family dwelling, may include the rooming and/or boarding of up to two (2)
persons, provided no separate kitchen is involved. (Including double-wide mobile homes.)
Townhouses.
1. Animal Keeping: Limitations on the keeping and maintenance of animals and fowl permitted in the
R zone.
a. At any time the keeping of animals becomes a nuisance, as to be determined by the Town
Council, the Town shall have the authority to force the violator to remedy the nuisance situation
within thirty (30) days of official notification..
b. Upon failure to remedy a nuisance situation, after proper notification, the Town shall have the
authority to force the violator to cease such operations.
c. Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the keeping of animals capable of inflicting
harm or endangering the health and safety of any person or property.
2. Limitations on double wide mobile homes permitted in the R zone:
a. Axles must be removed.
b. Mobile homes must be completely skirted with materials approved by the Commission.
3. Limitations of the development of Multiple-family dwellings permitted in the R zone.
a. Multiple-family dwellings to a maximum of two (2) units per structure may be placed on a single
X

A acre lot.

b. Maximum density created by development of duplex structure (s) shall be four (4) duplex units
per acre.
c. Permitted Accessory Uses. Accessory uses and structures are permitted in the R zone, provided
they are incidental to, and do not substantially alter the character of the permitted principal use or
structure. Such permitted accessory uses and structures include, but are not limited to, the
following:
1. Accessory buildings such as garages, carports, bath houses, greenhouses, gardening sheds,
recreation rooms, and similar structures which are customarily used in conjunction with
and incidental to a principal use or structure.
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3. Storage of materials used for the construction of a building, including a temporary
contractor's office and/or tool shed, provided that such uses are on the building site or
immediately adjacent thereto, and provided further that such shall be for only the period
of construction and thirty (30) days thereafter.
4. Storage of potentially useable materials for personal use may be kept; if storage of said
material does not pose a safety or fire hazard. Also storage must be kept in an orderly and
organized manner as farfrompublic view as possible.
5. Buildings or structures required for the housing, nurture, confinement or storage of animals
permitted in this zone, or equipment required for the care and keeping thereof.
6. Home occupations, subject to the conditions of Chapter 14 of This Title,
B. Conditional Uses. Uses and structures are permitted in the R zone only after a Conditional Use Permit
has been obtained and subject to the terms and conditions thereof.
10-4-3 LOT AREA
The minimum area for any lot or parcel of land in the R zone shall be 1 /4 acre (10,890 square feet).
> 10-4-4 LOT WIDTH
Each lot or parcel of land in the R zone, except corner lots, shall have a width of not less than seventy-five
(75 ) feet. Each comer lot or parcel in the R zone shall be ten (10) feet wider than the minimum required for
interior lots.
10-4-5 LOT FRONTAGE
Each lot or parcel of land in the R zone shall abut a public street for a minimum distance of seventy-five
(75) feet, or thirty-five (35) feet along the circumference of a cul-de-sac improved to Town standardsFrontage on a street end which does not have a cul-de-sac improved to Town standards shall not be counted
in meeting this requirement

10-4-6 PRIOR CREATED LOTS
Lots or parcels of land which were created prior to the application of the zone, shall not be denied a building
permit solely for reason of non-conformance with the parcel requirements of this chapter.
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10-4-7 LOT AREA PER DWELLING
Not more than one single-family dwelling, or multiple-family structure(i.e.), a duplex, to a maximum of two
(2) units may be placed on a lot area ( see 10-4--3).
1<M_8 YARD REQUIREMENT
The following minimum yard requirements shall apply in the R Zone.
A. Front yard. Each lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have afrontyard of not less than thirty (30) feet.
B. Side yard. Except as provided in sub-section "CM, each lot or parcel of land in the R Zone shall have a
side yard of not less than ten (10) feet, and the combined sum of the two side yards shall not be less than
twenty (20) feet
C. Side yard - Corner lots. On corner lots the side yard contigious to the street shall not be less than
twenty-four (24) feet and shall not be used for vehicle parking except such portion as is devoted to
driveway use for access to a garage or carport.
D. Side yard - Driveway. When used for access to a garage, carport, or parking area, a side yard shall be
wide enough to provide an unobstructed ten (10) foot driveway.
E. Side yard - Accessory building. An accessory building may be located on the property line if, and only if,
all of the following conditions are met:
1. The accessory building is located more than six (6) feet to the rear of any main building on the
same lot or the lot adjacent to the property line on which said building is being placed.
2. It has no openings on the side which is contiguous to the property line of an adjacent lot
3. It has one hour fire resistant construction in the wall adjacent to said property line.
4. It provides for all roof drainage to be retained on the subject lot or parcel.
An accessory building which does not meet the above conditions shall be at least five (5) feet from the side
property line.

F. Rear Yard. Each lot or parcel shall have a rear yard of no less than thirty (30) feet.

G. Rear yard - accessory building. An accessory building may be located on the property line so long as:
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2. It has one hourfireresistant construction in the wall adjacent to said property line.
3. It provides for all roof drainage to be retained on the subject lot or parcel.
4. A doublefrontageor through lot shall have afrontyard as required by the respective zone on
each street on which it abuts.
An accessory building which does not meet the above conditions shall be at least five (5) feet from the
rear property line.
10-4-9

PROJECTIONS INTO YARDS

A. Thefollowingstructures may be erected on or projected into any required yard.
1. Fences and walls in conformance with Town codes or ordinances.
2. Landscape elements, including trees, shrubs, agriculture crops and other plants.
3. Necessaiy appurtenances for utility services.
4. Front steps.
B. The structures listed below may not project into a minimumfrontyard.
1. Porches
2. Fireplace structures and bays.
3. Stairways, balconies, decks,fireescapes, and awnings.
10-4-10

BUILDING HEIGHT

No lot or parcel of kind in the R Zone shall have a building or structure used for dwelling or public assembly
which exceeds a height of three (3) stories or thirty-five (35) feet, whichever is higher. Roofs
above the square of the building, chimneys, flagpoles, church towers and similar structures not used for
human occupancy are excluded in determining height.

10-4-11 PARKING, LOADING AND ACCESS
Each lot or parcel in the R Zone shall have on the same lot or parcel off street parking sufficient to comply
with Chapter 13 of this title. Required parking spaces shall not be provided within a requiredfrontyard.

10-4-12 SITE PLAN APPROVAL
As required by the Uniform Building Code and the requirements of the Hinckley Town building permit.
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10-4-13 OTHER REQUIREMENTS
A. Signs. Refer to Chapter 15 Sign Ordinance.
B. Landscaping. All open areas between thefrontlot line and the rear line of the main building, except
driveways, parking areas, walkways, utility area, improved decks, patios, porches, etc., shall be maintained
with suitable landscaping.
C. Junk & Trash Storage. No trash, junk, or unusable materials shall be stored in an open area All such
materials must be screenedfrompublic streets and adjacent properties, or must be stored within an enclosed
building. Such materials must be stored in such a manner that it cannot be carried off the premises by natural
forces, causes, or animals. Any such storage shall not present an objectionable odor or health hazard.
Violators will be given twenty one (21) days to be in compliance. No Grandfather clause shall apply to this
provision.
D. Wrecked Vehicles. Wrecked vehicles cannot be parked on public streets for more than seventy two (72)
hours. They may not be kept on private property more than thirty (30) days unless screenedfrompublic
streets and adjacent properties, or stored within an enclosed building. No more that six (6) vehicles shall be
allowed at anytime. Proper rodent and weed control must be adhered to for public safety. No Grandfather
clause shall apply to this provision.

E. In-operable/Non-salvageable Vehicles. Such vehicles cannot be parked on public streets. Only two (2)
such vehicles may be stored within a minimum of one hundred (100) feetfromthefrontproperty line. All
other such vehicles must be screenedfrompublic streets and adjacent properties, or stored within an enclosed
building. No more than six (6) vehicles shall be allowed at anytime. Proper rodent and weed control must be
adhered to for public safety. Violators will be given thirty (30) days to be in compliance. No Grandfather
clause will apply to this provision.

F. In-operable Farm Implements. In-operable faim implements may be kept as long as they are in a neat and
orderly fashion. Proper rodent and weed control must be adhered to for public safety. They may be kept, if
being used as a landscaping or decorative item in thefrontyard. Violators will be given thirty (30) days to be
incompliance. No Grandfather clause will apply to this provision.
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G. Walls and Fences.
Front Yard! Fence that does not obstruct the view (e.g. chain link fence) may be erected to a height
of five (5) feet in anyfrontyard abutting a street within the set back area. The fence shall in no way
be closed in with adjacent plant material or strips of materials inserted into the fence so as to obstruct
vision. Any portion of a composite fence above thirty six (36) inches shall not obstruct vision.
Side Fences not abutting a street shall not exceed six (6) feet in height. This side fence shall not
extend into the thirty (30) feet front yard set back.
Side Fences in thefrontyard thirty (30) feet front set back shall not be over thirty six (36) inches in
height These fences shall be made of materials that shall not obstruct vision (for example, chain link,
field fence, spaced picket, ect.)
4.

Side and Rear Fences abutting a street shall not exceed six (6) feet in height. This side fence shall
not extend into the thirty (30) foot front yard set back.
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